Cancellation of removal for non-permanent residents
INA 240A(b)(1) lets an immigration judge cancel removal and grant a green card to a person with no status who has been here ten years, has good moral character, has no disqualifying conviction, and can show that a United States citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent or child would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Every word of that carries case law, and the hardship standard is the hardest in the statute.
Current as of September 2026. We re-check this page every quarter and after any rule change.
This is the form of relief people mean when they say "the ten-year law." It is not an amnesty and it is not automatic. It is a discretionary application, decided by an immigration judge after a full hearing, on a standard the Board has described as requiring hardship "substantially beyond" what ordinarily follows from a family member's deportation.
The four elements
| Element | What the statute says | Where it is litigated |
|---|---|---|
| (A) Ten years | Continuous physical presence in the United States for a period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of the application | The stop-time rule; absences; proof of presence for every year |
| (B) Good moral character | During the ten-year period | The statutory bars in INA 101(f); the catch-all; DUIs; the period measured backward from the decision |
| (C) No disqualifying conviction | Not convicted of an offense under INA 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2) or 237(a)(3) | The categorical approach; the burden on the applicant under Pereida |
| (D) Hardship | Removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the applicant's U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, parent or child | Everything. This is the case |
Authority: INA 240A(b)(1)(A)-(D). The application is Form EOIR-42B, filed with the immigration court, with biometrics processed through USCIS.
Ten years, and the stop-time rule
The ten years run backward from the date of the application, and they end early in two ways under INA 240A(d)(1): service of a Notice to Appear, or the commission of an offense referred to in 212(a)(2) that renders you inadmissible under 212(a)(2) or removable under 237(a)(2) or (a)(4). The offense stops time at commission, not conviction, under Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 689 (BIA 1999).
The Notice to Appear stops time only if it is a real one. Under Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018), a notice that omits the time and place of the hearing is not a "notice to appear under section 239(a)" and does not trigger the rule. Under Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021), the notice must be a single document; a later hearing notice does not complete it. For years of cases this meant the clock never stopped, and people who were short of ten years when served reached ten years while the case was pending.
Presence is also broken by a single absence of more than 90 days, or absences aggregating more than 180 days, under 240A(d)(2).
Ten years has to be proven, year by year
Tax returns, leases, pay records, school records, medical records, utility bills, money transfer receipts, church and community records, and declarations from people who knew you. The judge is looking for an unbroken decade. Gaps get filled with evidence or they get filled with the government's argument that you were away.
Good moral character
INA 101(f) lists categories of people who cannot be found to have good moral character, including habitual drunkards, people convicted of certain crimes, people who gave false testimony to obtain an immigration benefit, and anyone convicted of an aggravated felony. It ends with a catch-all: the list does not preclude a finding of bad character for other reasons. The period is the ten years, measured backward from the final decision rather than the filing, under Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793 (BIA 2005), so conduct while the case is pending counts.
Under Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019), two or more convictions for driving under the influence during the period create a presumption against good moral character. It is rebuttable, but the rebuttal has to be built.
Disqualifying convictions
Element (C) bars anyone convicted of an offense under INA 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2) or 237(a)(3). That includes crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled-substance offenses, aggravated felonies, firearms offenses, and domestic-violence offenses. Whether a particular conviction is one of these is decided under the categorical approach, and under Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224 (2021), the applicant bears the burden of showing the conviction is not disqualifying and loses if the record is inconclusive. Getting the certified record of conviction, and the statute of conviction as it read on the date of the offense, is the first task in any case with an arrest history.
Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
The Board's framework comes from three decisions in 2001 and 2002:
- Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001): the hardship must be "substantially beyond" what would ordinarily be expected from the deportation of a close family member. Factors include the ages, health and circumstances of the qualifying relatives, and conditions in the country of return.
- Matter of Andazola-Rivas, 23 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2002): denied where the children were healthy and the hardship was economic and educational, common to most families facing removal.
- Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2002): granted to a single mother of six with no family in Mexico and a family network entirely in the United States, on the cumulative weight of the factors.
Under Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020), hardship from a qualifying relative's medical condition has to be shown with evidence of the condition, the treatment, and whether that treatment is available in the country of return, and the judge weighs all of the hardship factors cumulatively rather than one at a time.
In Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), the Supreme Court held that whether established facts meet the hardship standard is a mixed question of law and fact that the courts of appeals can review under INA 242(a)(2)(D). Before that decision, hardship denials were largely unreviewable. Now the record built in front of the judge can be tested on appeal, which makes building it correctly more important, not less.
What a hardship record contains
The relative's medical and psychological records and a treating professional's letter. School records and any special-education plan. Evidence of the relative's own ties: siblings, grandparents, citizenship. Country-conditions evidence for the specific place you would return to, on health care, schooling, safety and the relative's ability to live there. Financial records showing what the household loses. Declarations from the relative, from you, and from teachers, doctors and community members. And a brief that ties each fact to a factor in Monreal and Recinas.
The qualifying relative
A United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent or child. "Child" means unmarried and under 21, and under Matter of Isidro-Zamorano, 25 I&N Dec. 829 (BIA 2012), the child must still be under 21 at the time of the final administrative decision. A relative who naturalizes or becomes a resident while the case is pending becomes a qualifying relative; a child who turns 21 stops being one. Timing is part of the strategy.
The 4,000 cap
INA 240A(e)(1) caps grants of cancellation of removal and suspension of deportation at 4,000 per fiscal year. When the cap is reached, judges who would grant reserve their decisions and the grant issues when a number becomes available. A hearing can end with the judge indicating the application will be granted and the actual order arriving in a later fiscal year. The cap affects timing, not eligibility.
Discretion, and the one-time rule
Meeting all four elements makes you eligible. The grant is still discretionary, and the judge weighs the whole record. Under INA 240A(c)(6), cancellation is not available to anyone who has previously been granted cancellation, suspension of deportation or 212(c) relief. It is a one-time remedy.
Fees
The government filing fee for Form EOIR-42B is $1,640 as of September 2026, for filings postmarked on or after February 1, 2026: the $100 EOIR fee plus a $1,540 fee added by the 2025 reconciliation law, paid through the EOIR Payment Portal, plus a $30 biometrics fee per person. None of it is our legal fee. A fee waiver on Form EOIR-26A may be requested from the judge for the EOIR component on a showing of inability to pay; whether the 2025 component can be waived is a question we have not confirmed, so ask us. The EOIR forms and fees page is authoritative and we confirm the amount with you before filing.
If cancellation is not available
The same facts that support cancellation often support something else. A citizen spouse or adult child may be able to petition for adjustment of status. A person who was abused by a citizen or resident spouse or parent may qualify for VAWA cancellation, which needs only three years and a lower hardship standard. A person who fears return may have an asylum, withholding or CAT claim. The applications are filed in the alternative.
Read next: cancellation for permanent residents, defective Notices to Appear and the stop-time rule, criminal convictions, or the individual hearing.
Common questions
Does hardship to me count?
No. The statute requires exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to your United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent or child. Hardship to you matters only insofar as it produces hardship to them. If you have no qualifying relative, this form of cancellation is not available, whatever your own circumstances.
When does the ten years stop counting?
Under the stop-time rule in INA 240A(d)(1), continuous physical presence ends when you are served with a Notice to Appear that contains the time and place of the hearing, or when you commit an offense referred to in INA 212(a)(2) that makes you inadmissible or removable, whichever is earlier. A Notice to Appear that omits the time and place does not stop the clock, under Pereira v. Sessions and Niz-Chavez v. Garland, and a later hearing notice cannot cure it. Presence is also broken by a single absence of more than 90 days or absences totaling more than 180 days.
My child will turn 21 before the judge decides. Does that matter?
Yes. Under Matter of Isidro-Zamorano, 25 I&N Dec. 829 (BIA 2012), the qualifying child must be under 21 and unmarried at the time of the final administrative decision, not only when the application is filed. With the immigration court backlog, this is a real risk, and it is one reason timing and the choice of qualifying relative have to be planned.
What does the 4,000 cap mean for my case?
INA 240A(e)(1) limits grants of cancellation and suspension of deportation to 4,000 per fiscal year. When the cap is reached, judges who would otherwise grant reserve their decisions until numbers are available in a later year. A grant can therefore be delayed after the hearing, sometimes for a long time. The cap does not change who is eligible.
Tell us where your case is. We will tell you what is still possible.
You get a free case review with an attorney, in your language. We speak English, Russian, Spanish and Uzbek in-house, and we bring in a live interpreter for anything else. We will tell you what stage you are at, which forms of relief are open to you, what your deadlines are, and whether we can help. If we cannot, we will say so.